
                         Roanoke Times
                 Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: TUESDAY, March 5, 1991                   TAG: 9103061110
SECTION: EDITORIAL                    PAGE: A-10   EDITION: METRO 
SOURCE: 
DATELINE:                                 LENGTH: Medium

DON'T CREDIT SDI FOR PATRIOT SUCCESS

IN THE GULF War, America used much of its sophisticated weaponry - and, it appears at this stage, most of those weapons measured up.

If there were large-scale glitches in the performance of high-tech U.S. weaponry, the information may not come out for quite a while. At its carefully managed news briefings, the Pentagon parceled out the most favorable data; a more balanced picture can emerge only in the war's aftermath.

Worth noting, too, is that some of the most costly weapons systems, such as the B-1B and B-2 bombers, were held back from the gulf conflict. Either they weren't suited for this kind of war, or they're not deemed reliable yet, or they're too expensive to risk.

Fortunately, other sophisticated weapons could be used. Especially gratifying was the performance of the Patriot. Rushed into positions in Israel and Saudi Arabia, this anti-missile missile intercepted and destroyed many of Saddam Hussein's Scuds.

The Scuds - lobbed by Saddam's forces at both military and civilian targets - may be primitive according to the Gulf War standards set by America's high-tech arsenal. But the fact that one Scud alone took 28 U.S. lives, when its warhead hit a barracks well behind the front lines, is evidence enough that "primitive" is not synonymous with "harmless." Almost surely, many allied and Israeli lives were saved under the Patriot's protection.

Now, backers of some other systems are trying to grab a ride on the Patriot's tail fins. The missile is being touted as proof that the concept of the Strategic Defense Initiative is sound and workable. But the two really have little in common.

To begin with, the Patriot is not a spinoff from SDI. The Army Air Defense Program Office funded and managed the Patriot; it has not received any of the $23 billion lavished on SDI since 1984.

Moreover, the Patriot shoots down tactical ballistic missiles, not strategic ones - a much larger and trickier target. SDI's developers have yet to settle even on a technique for detecting, locating and destroying strategic missiles.

Lasers, particle beams, rail guns, pop-up defenses, kinetic-kill vehicles all have been found wanting. The latest idea is "brilliant pebbles," which appears no more workable than any of its predecessors. SDI's original goal - erecting a shield to protect the entire nation against Soviet missiles - seems no less impractical than before the Gulf War.

Still, the gulf conflict has given Americans more reason for confidence in the general idea of the workability of advanced weaponry. In the post-Cold War era, it makes sense to defend against nuclear-armed or other missiles that might be lobbed by a Third World nation or even a well-heeled terrorist organization. Research along those lines should continue, and perhaps it could borrow from knowledge gained in the Patriot program.

by CNB