Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: THURSDAY, December 9, 1993 TAG: 9312140009
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: A23 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: RICHARD HANEY
DATELINE: LENGTH: Long
Specifically, he is blamed for disapproving the September recommendation of Gen. Colin Powell to dispatch tanks and armored personnel carriers to Somalia, thus contributing to the deaths of 18 American soldiers on Oct. 3.
Sen. Alphonse D'Amato, R-N.Y., called for Aspin's resignation, accusing him of ``turning a military decision into a political process''; some 40 House Republicans requested Aspin's dismissal. The Cleveland Plain Dealer called Aspin ``a good candidate for a court-martial''; the Washington Times called for his resignation. A former chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Adm. Thomas Moorer, said: ``You don't kibitz the doctor if you've never been to medical school.''
Fun though it may be to stick pins in Democrats in charge for a change, the politicians and press criticizing Aspin should remember that the secretary's decision was firmly rooted in the historical American tradition of civilian control of the military, even in time of war. Consider:
Abraham Lincoln, our most successful wartime president despite his almost complete lack of military experience, constantly ``interfered'' in military matters. An early example: Responding to political pressures, he disregarded Gen. McDowell's warnings that his army was too green to fight a major battle - Lincoln responded that both armies were ``green together.'' The result was a Union disaster at the first battle of Bull Run in 1861.
During World War II, senior Army and Navy leaders unanimously resisted the proposed invasion of North Africa in November 1942, regarding it as a distraction from the main effort to mount a cross-channel invasion. Franklin D. Roosevelt overruled his generals and admirals for a political goal: keeping Churchill happy.
Harry Truman's relieving Douglas MacArthur of command in 1951 over the issue of extending the Korean War to China was really a disagreement about political vs. operational concerns. For MacArthur, the issue was clear: ``When politics fails and the military takes over ... there should be no artifice under the name of politics which should handicap your own men, decrease their chances for winning, and increase their losses.'' Truman disagreed.
During the Vietnam War, the brass was confronted by a president - Lyndon Johnson - who did not trust them and who was determined the war would not interfere with his most important program, the Great Society. One result: the selection of daily bombing targets by White House civilians.
Even during Operation Desert Storm, considered the model for political noninterference in military matters, military leaders had to plan and operate within tight political bounds reflecting the need to keep a fragile coalition together and maintain domestic support.
Where should we draw the line between political and military concerns? There is no general rule, except that policy should not interfere with operational details unless the political implications are critical. This will always be a judgment call. It is perfectly OK for civilian leaders to prescribe planning constraints for air campaigns; it was not OK for LBJ to circle targets on maps in the White House situation room. (Political, in this context, does not mean partisan; in a democracy, soldiers' lives may not be risked to keep a party in office.)
When valid political and military considerations conflict, civilian leaders must prevail. But this only works when senior military leaders accept their responsibility to tell their bosses what they need to hear, not what they want to hear.
This has not always been the case. As Gen. Bruce Palmer wrote, during the Vietnam War, ``the [Joint Chiefs of Staff] apparently did not clearly and unequivocally tell the president and the secretary of defense that the strategy was fatally flawed,'' although they knew it was.
Decisions to deploy troops abroad always have potential domestic or international political significance; the regional commander, Marine Gen. Joseph Hoar, himself pointed out the ``political downside'' of sending the reinforcements in his message to Aspin requesting the additional forces. A decision by Aspin in September to send heavy armor would have provoked a congressional and media outcry that might have forced U.S. disengagement from Somalia, with consequences for policy in Haiti, Bosnia and elsewhere.
Aspin's assessment that the military risks were outweighed by the political costs may have been flawed; nevertheless, adding political considerations to the calculus is exactly what he is paid to do.
Critics may conclude that the Somalia decision was unwise; Aspin himself has acknowledged having miscalculated. That is far different from an assertion that the administration should ``limit itself to determining when military force should be used, then allow the military to decide how to mount the operation,'' as demanded by the Los Angeles Times.
Commanders' pleas to political leaders to ``untie my hands'' are understandable, especially with the lives of young American soldiers at stake, but while generals and admirals are responsible for winning battles and campaigns, political leaders are responsible for winning wars and shaping the peace to follow.
\ Richard Haney, a retired Army colonel, is a senior fellow at the National Defense University.
The Washington Post
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