Roanoke Times
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: SUNDAY, March 20, 1994 TAG: 9403220025
SECTION: EDITORIAL PAGE: B-3 EDITION: METRO
SOURCE: By IGOR A. ZEVELEV
DATELINE: LENGTH: Long
One fundamental factor, frequently missed in analyses of Russia, makes the situation more comprehensible: Russian reforms have been implemented simultaneously with the process of state-building and the creation of a new statehood. In 1992-93, the extreme weakness of the state institutions resulted, in many cases, in outcomes diametrically opposed to the intentions of the country's leaders.
Three interrelated factors have shaped the process of constitutional reform in Russia.
First, the new constitution adopted late last year is not a natural outgrowth of an existing social and political order, but seeks to create that order.
Second, the new Russia was born out of a revolution, of the abrogation of law to achieve what seemed expedient. The dissolution of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was accompanied by a minimum of concern with legal procedure. The leaders of Russia, Ukraine, and Belorussia who gathered conspiratorially had no legal right to declare the termination of the Soviet Union's existence. The leaders of other Union republics, as well as President Gorbachev, not to mention the parliaments of the republics or the Soviet Union's 270 million ordinary citizens, did not even know about the gathering.
Third, the communist legacy, incompatible with any notion of the rule of law, cannot be overcome easily.
Russia, both before the Bolsheviks came to power and after, knew little about the concepts of limited government, loyal opposition or popular sovereignty. There were no traditions of the rule of law or of constitutionalism.
Four successive Soviet constitutions preceded Mikhail Gorbachev, but there was no constitutionalism as a specific process of governing. The constitution was no more than window-dressing for the regime.
Gorbachev tried to realize such ideas as the supremacy of the law, the separation of powers, the precedence of the individual over the state, and civil and political rights.In 1988 to 1990 almost half the ``Brezhnev Constitution'' was amended or revised. Among the changes were creation of a democratically elected parliament, introduction of the presidency, and revision of the Communist Party's role. More important than all these changes was the attempt to convert the Soviet constitution from an abstract document into the principal framework for politics and the state's functioning.
The consequence was destabilization of the old Communist Party-led order. While constitutionalism was newly born and still weak, old authoritarianism lost its major pillar, undisputed party leadership. The centuries-old empire disintegrated.
1990 to 1991 was a time of tremendous legal muddle. All the republics of the Soviet Union declared their independence and the superiority of their legislature over the all-union one, but the Soviet Union continued to exist and function until December 1991. Nobody understood clearly what law was in effect and what was not. It was a time of cruel political struggle between all-union authorities and those of the various republics, and particularly between Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin. All parties appealed to their favorite provisions of the corresponding constitutions.
Finally, Gorbachev resigned from the presidency of the Soviet Union on Dec. 25, 1991, and 17 days later the state ceased to exist. Yeltsin occupied Gorbachev's office in the Kremlin on Dec. 27 and inherited part of the former empire.
From January 1992 to September 1993, the political struggle over Russia's future changed. Instead of confrontation with the all-union authorities, Russian politicians started to squabble with each other. Again, the constitutional issues were among the most controversial.
A simplistic interpretation of the 1992-93 struggle in terms of ``good guys/democrats'' vs. ``bad guys/communists'' has little explanatory value. On the surface, it looked like the legislative power struggled against the executive. In Western countries, this was interpreted as hard-line communist resistance to Yeltsin's democratic reforms.
The reality, however, was a mixture of personal power-struggles and the clash of different visions of reforms. Those who advocated a complete retreat to the past's so-called ``real socialism'' were marginal.
Drafting a new, post-communist constitution for the Russian Federation became a focal point of the confrontation. The Congress of People's Deputies, the highest legislative body in Russia, was not in a hurry and, in spite of Yeltsin's heavy lobbying, managed to delay endorsing the overall concept and basic principles until last year.
There were no serious objections to human rights or other liberal and democratic principles. Really controversial was the structure of state power. Should Russia become a presidential or a parliamentary republic? And should Russia become a constitutionally united state or a treaty federation formed through contracts among its members?
Looking for a way out of the deadlock, Yeltsin revealed his own even more presidentialist draft in April 1993 and convened a special body, the Constitutional Assembly, in June to review it. He was trying to outmaneuver the congress, but the assembly tended to incorporate ideas from the previous drafts and to soften harsh presidentialism accents. Yeltsin was dismayed, and the specter of political and constitutional muddle reappeared in Russia.
In this standstill, Yeltsin made a decisive and unconstitutional decision. He dissolved the congress, the parliament, and then the Constitutional Court. On Sept. 21, the most dramatic period in the history of independent Russia began. It lasted until Oct. 4, when Yeltsin's tanks shelled and crushed the defiant parliament. About 150 people, mostly civilians, were killed. The West applauded the victory of democracy in Russia.
Was it a constitutional crisis? Not entirely, although the struggle over the constitution - or, to be precise, over the constitution's provisions on the structure of the state - was an important part of the crisis. The country is still in a period of instability and painful withdrawal from communism and empire. The adoption of the new constitution on Dec. 12, 1993, could not alter this reality.
Yeltsin's Nov. 9 presidential draft of the constitution featured an unbelievable imbalance of power, giving the president authority to nominate the prime minister and appoint directly all ministers, as well as - the really crucial point - to dissolve parliament. In strong presidential republics, such as France, the head of state's powers are balanced not only by other branches of government but also by democratic traditions, respect for human rights, a mature system of political parties and membership in the European Union. In Russia, too strong a presidency leads to authoritariansim.
Most other features of the new draft, such as human-rights provisions, were identical to previous drafts. But in Russia, with its long tradition of disregarding written law, this was not important. What was of importance was who would control the state apparatus.
The brief one-month discussion on the new draft, held immediately after the massacre in Moscow when some political parties and newspapers were banned, could hardly be called a democratic process. The official turnout for the referendum was 52 percent of registered voters; only 58 percent of those who bothered to participate said ``yes.'' Speculation in Moscow is that the turnout was in fact less than 50 pecent, which would mean the referendum failed.
A Yeltsin spokesman pathetically declared that Russia, upon adopting the new constitution, had joined the family of liberal democratic nations. To the contrary, it was impossible for Russia to make such a leap overnight. The adoption of the new constitution, even if we assume it is ideal, does not and cannot mean the victory of constitutionalism in Russia. The road toward that goal will be long and painful.
The situation now is unstable and unpredictable. Some provisions of the new Russian constitution might be a serious barrier for constitutional democracy: Imagine Zhirinovsky in power, with all the presidential prerogatives granted by the current constitution. Ironically, it probably would be necessary to take unconstitutional measures to end the nightmarish scenario.
Igor A. Zevelev, currently a visiting professor in international studies at the University of Washington in Seattle, is deputy director of the Center for Developing Countries at the Institute of World Economy and International Relations in Moscow.
by CNB