ROANOKE TIMES
Copyright (c) 1995, Roanoke Times
DATE: Sunday, December 10, 1995 TAG: 9512090005
SECTION: HORIZON PAGE: F-1 EDITION: METRO
TYPE: COMMENT
SOURCE: DONALD E. NUECHTERLEIN
As President Clinton deploys more than 20,000 troops to enforce a fragile peace in Bosnia, Americans should keep clearly in mind five realities surrounding this operation.
First, it is a long-term commitment by the United States to keep the peace not just in Bosnia, but also in the entire Balkans region of southern Europe.
It is fallacious, in my view, to think that this deployment of Army, Navy and Air Force units to Bosnia, Croatia and the Adriatic will be finished in one year, or even five. Although Clinton may withdraw a substantial number of ground troops next year if fighting between Serbs and Muslims does not resume neither he nor a successor president will be able to withdraw the entire American contribution to this peace-enforcing mission without a tremendous loss to America's credibility abroad.
One should recall that President Truman in 1950 sent troops to Korea to stabilize the security situation in that part of Asia, and they are still there, 45 years later. Given the dangerous situation in Bosnia, we may have peace-enforcing troops stationed there for 20 years.
A second reality of the Bosnia crisis is that Europe proved incapable of solving the problem by itself during the past four years and is powerless to stop the war from spreading without American troops and American leadership.
In the end, there seems to be no substitute for NATO forces coming together under overall U.S. command.
This reality is difficult for many Americans to understand and accept. Even though the Cold War is over and Europe is moving toward economic and political union, the major west European states - Britain, France, Germany - have proved incapable of stopping the killing in Bosnia and forcing the sides to accept compromise. American pressure, economic incentives, and the promise of U.S. troops were needed to get Serb, Croat and Bosnian leaders to come to Dayton, Ohio, and resolve their differences.
A third reality is that the cost of the Bosnia operation will be much higher than initial projections. Originally the Pentagon said it would cost $1.6 billion to deploy the force for one year. Secretary of Defense Perry recently increased that figure to $2 billion. Some officials say privately they think it will be more like $5 billion. If some of the troops, perhaps 5,000, remain in Bosnia indefinitely, as I predict, the long-term cost will be considerably higher.
The history of American military interventions over the last 30 years suggests that this one will last longer and cost more than the White House and Pentagon admit. One should add another $1 billion or $2 billion that the administration will commit to an economic and humanitarian aid package for Bosnia. Although European and other countries will contribute troops and funds to the security and rehabilitation effort, the United States will pay a large proportion of the bills.
Another reality is that Clinton made this commitment despite strong public opposition and without firm congressional support. Most Republicans and many Democrats in Congress oppose sending ground troops to Bosnia, but the president says he has the constitutional authority to do so without congressional approval.
Republican Sens. Robert Dole and John McCain, both war veterans, say they don't agree with the president's decision but will nevertheless support the troops in their mission to pacify Bosnia. In fact, enough Republicans will support the deployment to enable the president to claim the semblance of bi-partisan support for the mission.
In my view, Clinton showed political courage in making this decision. His policymakers concluded that the situation in the Balkans was getting so dangerous that he needed to act even without congressional support in order to protect U.S. national interests.
One may disagree with that assessment, but the president clearly has the responsibility to decide when this country's interests are threatened. President George Bush did so when Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990, and presidents before him did so. Clinton now has the task of persuading the public that his assessment is correct and that the introduction of 30,000 troops into the Balkans will bring peace to the area.
A final reality, the driving force behind Clinton's unpopular decision is his belief that the fruits of victory in Europe after the Cold War ended will be in jeopardy if civil wars in the former Yugoslavias continue.
The potential for war between Croatia and Serbia was growing before the Dayton agreement last month, and the likelihood for war between Serbia and Albania and Macedonia was also increasing. These Balkan wars have the potential of bringing in neighboring countries - Greece, Turkey (NATO countries) and perhaps Bulgaria. Europeans painfully recall that World War I started in the Balkans and nearly destroyed the entire continent.
Those who claim that only the United States has the military power and the diplomatic clout to force the Balkan countries to negotiate are probably correct in that assessment. American "leadership," as cited by Secretary of State Warren Christopher, in fact means the ability to force compromises on reluctant parties, as occurred in Dayton.
Nevertheless, America's new role does not guarantee that peace will be enforced quickly in Bosnia. The next few months will tell whether Bosnian Serbs, who committed most of the atrocities and are determined not to give up their hold on Sarajevo, will be pacified.
Clinton was prudent in telling GIs in Germany last week that casualties will occur, but that it is the price we pay for helping to stop the killing in Bosnia. He should also tell them, and the public, that it will take longer than a year to bring real peace.
A troubling issue about this major change in U.S. foreign policy is whether the president has the authority on his own to commit a large number of troops to a dangerous situation where casualties will certainly occur. This is a fundamental question that has not been adequately answered.
As commander-in-chief, a president has the authority to deploy a limited number of troops to protect the security interests of the United States, as in Grenada and Panama. But Congress has authority to declare war, meaning that it should approve in situations where the danger of a bigger conflict is great and the financial costs will be large.
The Bosnia operation, as currently envisioned, lies in a gray area between a president's and Congress' constitutional responsibility. If the deployment is short in duration and does not result in large casualties, the president, in my view, probably had the authority to send the troops without express authorization by Congress.
In view of uncertainties surrounding the president's decision on Bosnia, Congress - particularly the Senate - would be wise to instruct Clinton that it intends to review his decision in six months and that the administration will be required to give a full public accounting of the deployment.
Congress needs to assert its role in this decision-making process so that the public will not conclude, as it did during the Vietnam war, that the president has unchecked powers to conduct a war which has not been authorized.
Donald Nuechterlein is a political scientist and writer who lives in Charlottesville. He is the author of "America Recommitted: U.S. National Interests in a Restructured World," and recently returned from teaching in Germany.
LENGTH: Long : 128 lines ILLUSTRATION: PHOTO: U.S. Army Capt. Philip Ugap arrives in Zagreb onby CNBWednesday. Graphic.