The Virginian-Pilot
                            THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT  
              Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.

DATE: Sunday, June 25, 1995                  TAG: 9506270446
SECTION: COMMENTARY               PAGE: J1   EDITION: FINAL 
                                             LENGTH: Long  :  293 lines

HAMPTON ROADS ROUNDTABLE BOSNIA: NO PEACE TO KEEP PERSISTENT WARFARE IN REGION PUTS U.N. PEACEKEEPING TO SEVERE TEST

Monday is the 50th anniversary of the signing of the United Nations Charter, a document drawn up in the closing months of this century's second devastating world war. In it, the nations of the world vowed to ``save succeeding generations from the scourge of war.''

A half-century later, that dream is far from being realized. Even the end of the Cold War has not produced the peaceful era that many had hoped for. Instead, the dissolution of the communist bloc has bred several regional and ethnic conflicts.

One of the most intractable is in the former Yugoslavia. For more than three years now, multiple factions have been at war there. Civilians have been the victims of horrible atrocities. The Bosnian capital, Sarajevo, has been under nearly constant siege.

The U.N. has been trying to play a ``peacekeeping'' role, but after three years there is still no peace to keep.

The Virginian-Pilot and public radio station WHRV brought three local experts and a visiting Sarajevan journalist together to discuss the stubborn Bosnian war and what it portends for the future of U.N. peacekeeping. The discussion was moderated by staff writer Bill Sizemore.

The panelists' reluctant consensus: The Bosnian tragedy may have to get worse before it gets better.

What do Sarajevans think about the U.N. presence there? Is it doing any good? Why has the U.N. been unable to fulfil its mission so far?

Sanja Omanovic: I think most Sarajevans think they were limited because there was no political decision which would allow them to do something more. We heard many excuses during these three years: They don't have enough equipment, they don't have enough forces on the ground. They are called ``peacekeepers.'' That means they should keep peace. Unfortunately, there was no peace to keep.

Also, according to the resolutions of the United Nations, they should protect convoys with humanitarian aid and food for civilians. They don't do it now for more than two months. Warehouses in Sarajevo are empty, completely. The airport, which should be open all the time, is closed since April. They also should keep safe areas safe - and we all know how safe Sarajevo is. Also, they should protect civilians, and we also know how civilians in Sarajevo live.

So I, as many other Sarajevans, really don't see any purpose of their being in Sarajevo or in Bosnia-Herzegovina, except that we know that they are spending a lot of money for their being there.

What does the situation in Bosnia tell us as far as the future of U.N. peacekeeping is concerned? Is it a flawed concept, or is there still hope for it?

Maria Fornella: Well, I don't think it's a flawed concept. It is just that traditional peacekeeping has not been a reality in this case. We are in a situation of flux. We are in a situation of transition, so the handbook, so to speak, of peacekeeping in the post-Cold War era hasn't been written yet.

And I take issue with what someone said before about the mission being a total failure. I think that the mission was to alleviate human suffering, the suffering of victims, of innocent victims. And to that extent, for many months at least, the Sarajevo airport has been kept open and food has been delivered.

You have to understand that the United Nations is working under many restrictions here, and one of those is the impartiality aspect. The U.N. has not defined the aggressor in this case.

What do you think the next step should be?

Daniel N. Nelson: I have from the outset been a person who's been rather hawkish, to use that terribly misused term. I think it is up to the great powers, and particularly the United States, to enforce U.N. sanctions, to use, whenever it is feasible and possible, punitive use of force. I supported the air attack on the ammunition dump outside of Pale. I think it should have been followed with additional air attacks. I do not shrink from that in the least.

G. William Whitehurst: Practically speaking, in the environment that exists right now there would be very, very little support for the United States becoming an active participant in military operations there.

Look at the enormous amount of attention that was given to a single flier who very fortunately survived being shot down and being rescued. If you listen to the statements made by leaders in the Congress, not one, that I know of, has been raised to the effect that the United States should become militarily involved in the Balkans. I think that in the real world it's not going to happen. . . .

First of all, I don't think that air strikes are going to do it. In the past they have not been conclusive. Look at the historical roots of this quarrel. This is really the third Balkan war. The last one was in 1913. Those feelings are so deep, I think you'd have to bomb Belgrade. Really. To get the point across that you really mean business. And if you're not prepared to do that, then don't do anything unless it's to lift the arms embargo and let the Muslims have a fair playing ground to resolve this conflict.

Jimmy Carter has called the chances of ending the crisis through any kind of military means almost hopeless at this point. He says that it's time to at least try to pursue a mediated settlement. Do any of you here believe that such an effort could yield results?

Omanovic: I don't think so, because that's nothing new. His suggestion doesn't have anything more than we had in December of 1994. Both sides signed a settlement, and we all did see what happened with that. So he also suggested that sanctions against Serbia would be lifted temporarily during the negotiations, and I don't think that the Bosnian government will accept that. Because their position is, they have nothing to negotiate with. You have to have a strong position if you want to negotiate. You have to have something.

Nelson: I don't believe that Carter is correct in saying that we should exclude military activity. I agree it isn't going to be a solution, but the alternative, which is simply to capitulate to aggression, is also no solution.

We're getting suggestions here that the U.N. should pull back or pull out, which it seems to me amounts to giving up. What do you think about that?

Fornella: I think that there's still a possibility that the political settlement will work.

Nelson: I don't want the U.N. to pack up and leave now. I want, as Maria was saying, to see if a strengthened resolve could be created. Now God knows, that depends upon people in the White House as well as other centers of power in the sense of being able and willing to use punitive use of force. . . . Now this is a racheting-up potentially. But I believe . . . the Serbs might get a message finally.

Whitehurst: Well, let me just say that I hope you're right. Both of you. But I'm very, very skeptical of the outcome. I truly am. I don't think the Serbs are going to respond to this. This thing has been going on too long and the depth of their feelings are so great. . . .

I can't believe any of you really believe that this thing's going to have a peaceful outcome.

Nelson: But if the alternative is between being more committed vis-a-vis backing out and saying, ``Let them duke it out,'' then I think the United States, because of our historic commitment to Europe, because of our commitment to the former Yugoslavia going back to President Wilson, because of our presence in NATO. . . , all of those reasons and more, we will become more involved. Either we will do it in a timely fashion when it's relatively less expensive or we will be dragged in as we have been previously in this century.

If this current effort at peacekeeping does fail and we end up, as someone said, letting them ``duke it out,'' would you say that there should be a role for the United States in that?

Nelson: The United States would not be able to stay out of a wider conflict. See, it's a massive miscalculation on the part of folks, whether it's politicians and business leaders in America or ordinary folks, it's a massive miscalculation to think that we can kind of lean back and let them fight their little wars and when they're tired, they'll put down their arms and then we can maybe come in and set up a McDonald's and sell Coca-Cola to them. It won't happen that way.

In the Balkans and in many, many other parts of the world, conflicts fester. They spread. . . .

Because of the intermingling of economies, because of the previous involvement of the United States and Europe, if the whole of the continent of Europe is not secured, then incrementally our security is demeaned and despoiled as well, and we're watching that happen even as we speak.

Your comments reminded me somewhat of the domino theory. Let me bring up the Vietnam analogy here. We found out in that era that we got involved in a civil war and ended up spending billions of dollars and losing tens of thousands of American lives and tearing our nation apart. What's to stop something like that from happening again were we to ratchet up our involvement in the former Yugoslavia?

Nelson: This is not the march of communism. It's not a domino that's one leading to the next. That would be far too simplistic, and it certainly is not what I'm suggesting.

What I'm suggesting is more of an infection. I don't know if it's the Ebola virus, but it's certainly something akin to it. There's something very, very dangerous happening not only in the eastern half of Europe but it is also infecting, I think, the western half of Europe. And I might add, with the Oklahoma bombing and militias and all sorts of other things, I don't think we're immune either.

Omanovic: We can talk about Bosnia's side and Serbia's side and Croatia's side in the Bosnia war, but nobody's talking about civilians, and civilians are suffering. . . .

Politicians make their decisions, but people in Sarajevo have no place to escape. And they have the same situation for three years, and I really believe that something has to be done, and the price can be very high in casualties. I don't think people in Sarajevo care anymore about casualties, because we know we cannot go through next winter.

I think you should spend just one day in Sarajevo during the winter, and I think you will understand everything then.

There've been some calls in Congress to lift the arms embargo on the Bosnian government. But the administration still says that's not the way to go. Any thoughts on that?

Omanovic: I was afraid of lifting the arms embargo before. Now I'm not afraid anymore, because during these three years I saw, as the other people in Bosnia and Sarajevo, I saw that nobody will, unfortunately, do anything to stop the war and to stop the suffering. That's why I'm making the point all the time about the suffering of the civilians, because I am a civilian. I'm just a journalist from Sarajevo who's trying to hide and survive. That's not easy to be said, but I'm trying to do that for three years. Not for six days. And the other people in Sarajevo also.

And now I am for the lifting of the arms embargo, because I think Sarajevo is the key of the war, and something simply has to be done to change conditions and to change the situation in which the people in Sarajevo live. That's what I think. Something has to be done.

Fornella: But isn't it too late to lift the arms embargo? Is that a policy option right now? And has it, in fact, worked?

Nelson: From a practical standpoint, my own opinion would be that lifting the arms embargo, first, would not have a major effect on the battlefield very quickly. . . .

It might have a beneficial side effect in terms of sending another message to Belgrade.

But I have to say, again, my own viewpoint about what the best options are would be a much more forthright leadership position, which I'm afraid will only come when the situation has moved towards an even more negative scenario. ILLUSTRATION: Map

Graphics

YUGOSLAVIA'S CIVIL WAR: A TIME LINE

1990

January: Congress rescinds the Communist Party's monopoly,

setting the stage for multiparty elections.

1991

June: Slovenia and Croatia declare independence. Federal

parliament sends in troops.

September: U.N. imposes an arms embargo on the entire country.

1992

March: Bosnians vote for independence. Bosnian Serbs threaten to

secede.

April: Serbs begin shelling Sarajevo. U.N. peacekeepers arrive in

Croatia. Serbia and Montenegro announce that they alone constitute

the new Yugoslavia.

May: U.N. imposes economic and political sanctions.

July: Bosnian Croats declare an independent state comprising

nearly a third of Bosnian territory.

October: U.N. imposes a ``no fly'' zone over Bosnia, prohibiting

all military aircraft flights.

1993

February: U.N. mandates an international war crimes tribunal.

1994

April: A five-nation ``contact group'' - the United States,

Britain, France, Germany and Russia - assumes responsibility for

devising a peace agreement.

1995

May: NATO planes bomb Bosnian Serb ammunition dumps after a

four-month cease-fire collapses. In retaliation, Serbs seize nearly

400 U.N. troops as hostages. They are later released.

June: U.N. abandons weapon collection points around Sarajevo.

Bosnian government forces launch a new offensive with the ultimate

aim of breaking the siege.

BETH BERGMAN/Staff color photos

THE ROUNDTABLE PARTICIPANTS

DANIEL N. NELSON is a professor of international studies at Old

Dominion University who has traveled extensively in the former

Yugoslavia

MARIA FORNELLA is a political science instructor and director of the

Model United Nations program at Old Dominion University.

SANJA OMANOVIC, a Sarajevan journalist, is in Hampton Roads on a

visiting fellowship with the National Forum Foundation.

G. WILLIAM WHITEHURST is a retired Republican U.S. congressman from

Virginia's 2nd District. He lives in Norfolk.

WHO'S WHO IN THE FORMER YUGOSLAVIA AND WHAT THEY WANT

YUGOSLAVIA

Two republics, Serbia and Montenegro, remain of six that once

made up the Yugoslav federation. Economic sanctions were imposed

three years ago for Yugoslavia's support of Serb insurgents in

Bosnia and Croatia.

BOSNIAN SERBS

They control about two-thirds of Bosnia after three years of war.

They have been isolated by the world community and Serbia for

refusing an international peace plan. The Bosnian Serb leadership's

goal is to hang on to as much of Bosnia as possible, to form an

ethnically pure state and to maintain enough independence to avoid

falling into the hands of war crimes investigators.

BOSNIAN GOVERNMENT

The government is led by Muslims but also represents Serbs and

Croats who have remained loyal to its ideal of a multiethnic

society. It is intent on getting as much land back from the Serbs as

possible. Last year, the government reluctantly accepted an

international plan giving it and its Croat allies 51 percent of

Bosnia, and the Serbs 49 percent.

BOSNIAN CROATS

Concentrated in the center and west of Bosnia-Herzegovina, Croats

fought the Bosnian government for about a year before agreeing to

form a federation in March 1994. Since then, they have on occasion

fought alongside the Bosnian army against the Serbs.

CROATIAN GOVERNMENT

Croatia lost a third of its territory to a Serb rebellion in

1991, when the republic declared its independence from the old

Yugoslavia. It is chafing to get that territory back. On May 1, it

launched a surprise offensive and retook the most vulnerable of four

pieces of Serb-held land.

CROATIAN SERBS

Serbs control a large stretch of southern Croatia, a chunk of

territory south of the capital, Zagreb, and a piece of far eastern

Croatia, bordering the Danube River and Serbia. They rebelled in

1991, saying they were afraid that an independent Croatia would

repeat the slaughter of Serbs that took place under a Nazi puppet

state in World War II. They vow never to live under Croatian rule.

by CNB