THE VIRGINIAN-PILOT
Copyright (c) 1995, Landmark Communications, Inc.
DATE: Sunday, August 27, 1995 TAG: 9508250771
SECTION: COMMENTARY PAGE: J1 EDITION: FINAL
SOURCE: BY STEVE YETIV
LENGTH: Medium: 93 lines
Saddam Hussein's in-laws are in the news. The recent defections of high-ranking Iraqi officials raise three key questions: What happened in Iraq? What do the defections mean? What should U.S. policy be?
Persian Gulf security hinges, in part, on good answers.
What actually happened in Iraq? Three scenarios can explain the defection to Jordan of Lt. Gen. Hussein Kamel Hassan Majeed, the architect of Saddam's war machine, and Lt. Col. Saddam Kamel Hassan Majeed, the head of his personal guards.
Under scenario I, Hussein Kamel committed a political ``mistake.'' He then fled to save himself from Saddam's wrath. Once in Jordan, he conveniently assumed the noble role of overthrowing Saddam. Given Iraq's Byzantine political arena, he might have left even based on rumor of impending doom.
However, according to Iraqi expert Amatzia Barman, who has important Iraqi contacts, Saddam freely let Kamel leave for Bulgaria before his defection. Although Kamel never made it past Jordan, this suggests that Saddam did not expect his defection.
In scenario II, Kamel left because Saddam's sons, Uday and Qosai, eclipsed or annoyed him. Uday reportedly often interfered with and even usurped Kamel's responsibilities, with Saddam acquiescing to strengthen his loyal son at Kamel's expense.
Under scenario III, Kamel left Iraq because Saddam subordinated Iraq's national goals to his own obsession with defying U.N. sanctions. From Jordan, Kamel would launch a glorious coup in conjunction with internal forces to regain, as he told one French news agency, the ``credibility'' that Iraq has ``lost on the international and Arab scene.'' Asked why he did not act from within Iraq, Kamel reiterated that his ``honor'' and pledge as a general prevented it. More likely, under this scenario, he figured that an internal coup attempt was too risky.
Each of these scenarios has different implications for answering the second question: What do the defections mean? Scenario I gives Saddam the edge and suggests that his security forces are effective. Indeed, if Kamel left from fear of death, this indicates that Saddam is atop his political scene and aspiring plotters know it. This further suggests that coup attempts, which are hard to orchestrate from abroad, will likely fail without great external support and a significant internal power base.
Scenario II also means thumbs up for Saddam. He knows whom to trust and forced a would-be coup plotter out of power.
Scenario III is the most rosy for Saddam's foes: Saddam's henchmen are not so reliable and may even support his ouster. This would indicate that Saddam is losing serious control and that Kamel may have an internal power base.
Yet in Iraq, Saddam is number one, and the number two man is really 202 down the list. Kamel has excellent internal contacts, but this hardly means that he has a serious power base that could withstand Saddam's scrutiny and recent widespread purges. If he were strong, why did he flee?
Regardless of which scenario is most accurate, the defections are very serious if considered in light of the March coup attempt. This revolt did not involve the entire Dulaym clan, as mistakenly reported, but rather the Albunimr tribe from the city of Ramadi.
The chance that the Albunimr would unseat Saddam was nil. However, it was the first time since the rise of Saddam's Baath party in 1968 that a Sunni tribe traditionally loyal to Saddam attempted a coup. Shock waves rippled through Iraq.
The recent defections are Part II of this evolving drama. In addition to offering great information, tailored though it may be, they confirm the weakening of Saddam's Sunni power base. They indicate despair within Saddam's inner circle, which could reach a boiling point in the future. Increasingly, Saddam has fewer and fewer individuals on whom he can count, and he faces greater difficulties in maintaining power.
This brings us to the third question: What should U.S. policy be? First, Washington's imprimatur may well derail the defectors. Hating Saddam does not equal liking Americans. No self-respecting Iraqi will support American-led or harbored Arab defectors. A low political profile combined with U.S. military readiness in the region makes sense. Saddam's troop movements are probably bravado at this point, despite Kamel's disclosure that Saddam intended to invade Kuwait again. But better safe than sorry.
Second, as suggested by Iraq's argument that Kamel was responsible for hiding nuclear secrets from the U.N., Saddam is more than ever inclined to appease the U.N. Washington should resist Saddam's overtures to the U.N.. Saddam can reverse his plight and re-emerge strong if he sells enough oil to buy friends.
Meanwhile, Washington should help protect the defectors, seedy as they are. Saddam's hit teams killed two Iraqi nuclear scientists, who defected to Amman after Desert Storm. The death of the defectors would send a chill down anti-Saddam elements in Iraq and deprive Washington of key information on Iraq's weapons of mass destruction. ILLUSTRATION: Color photo
Steve Yetiv is an assistant professor of political science at Old
Dominion University and a research affiliate at Harvard University's
Center for Middle Eastern Studies.
by CNB